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NO. 23 APRIL 2019 Introduction 
UN Peacekeeping in Mali 
Time to Adjust Minusma’s Mandate 
Denis M. Tull 
The mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (Minusma) ends on 30 June 2019. There is little doubt that the UN Security Coun-
cil will extend the mission. Less clear is how Minusma contributes to Mali’s stabilisa-
tion and how the mandate could be altered to increase the mission’s effectiveness. In 
light of changing conditions in Mali, the Security Council should consider a stronger 
Minusma engagement in central Mali. But for this to happen, cuts must be made in 
the north. 
 
Operating since 2013, Minusma currently 
counts 15,365 personnel and a budget of 
around $1 billion. Its strategic priority is to 
support the implementation of the Algiers 
Peace Agreement, signed in 2015 between 
the Malian government and the Coordina-
tion des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), 
an umbrella of northern rebel groups. At 
a practical level, Minusma is assisting the 
restoration of state authority in northern 
Mali, the establishment of a new institu-
tional architecture for the Malian state, 
security-sector reform, the demobilisation 
of combatants, and national reconciliation. 
Other objectives include the protection of 
civilians as well as facilitating national and 
local dialogue. Counter-terrorism is not part 
of the mandate. However, incessant terror-
ist attacks have severely limited Minusma’s 
ability to carry out its mission effectively. 
The renewal of the mandate will not be 
straightforward, nor should it be. Whilst 
the US has exerted significant pressure to 
reduce the overall budget for UN peace 
operations, worrying developments in Mali 
make an in-depth review of Minusma’s 
mandate necessary, particularly its contri-
bution to the peace process and its response 
to the country’s deteriorating situation, 
especially central Mali. 
Context and Current Challenges 
The implementation of the Algiers Agree-
ment has made little progress since 2015, 
although some headway was made in 
recent months in demobilising combatants 
and establishing transitional administra-
tions in northern Mali at the district level. 
On the positive side, over the past two years 
or so, no fighting has occurred between 
the parties to the Algiers Agreement, that 
is, the government, its allied forces (Plate-
form), and the CMA. Violence in the north 
is exerted by jihadist forces operating under 
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the Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux mu-
sulmans (GSIM), which constantly targets 
both the Algiers signatories and Minusma. 
On 20 January 2019, for example, 10 blue 
helmets lost their lives in an attack on the 
Minusma camp in Aguelhok. 
The peace process – understood as the 
political integration of northern elites into 
the state – is fragile and reversible, though 
peace dividends in the guise of financial 
and material incentives contribute to stabi-
lising the situation at a low level. Moreover, 
the cooperation between the CMA and the 
government during the 2018 presidential 
elections made clear that the conflict is pri-
marily elite-based and that mutual accom-
modation of these actors’ interests is pos-
sible. 
Arguably more alarming than the situa-
tion in the north are current trends in the 
regions of Mopti and Ségou in central Mali, 
where violence is increasingly spreading 
towards the south-west (Koulikoro) and 
across borders towards Niger and Burkina 
Faso. Two closely intertwined drivers of 
violence can be distinguished: interethnic 
violence and jihadist violence against the 
state and its supporters (Minusma). 
The first and most important type is vio-
lence against civilians, mainly by militias 
associated with ethnic groups (Dogon and 
Peul). Their motives range from self-protec-
tion and score-settling to simple criminality, 
though competition over scarce local re-
sources provides the structural background 
for conflict. For the past two years, a string 
of attacks on villages has taken place across 
the Mopti region. In the last 12 months 
alone, 600 civilians have been massacred 
and thousands have been newly displaced, 
according to the UN. In January and Feb-
ruary 2019, 70 per cent of all human rights 
violations in the country took place in the 
central part of Mali. On 23 March, 160 Peul 
were slaughtered in the village of Ogossa-
gou (Mopti), allegedly by a Dogon militia. 
The second driver of violence is the 
jihadist Katiba Macina, which is part of the 
GSIM. It directs violence primarily towards 
the Malian security forces and Minusma. 
The number of improvised explosive de-
vices in central Mali more than tripled 
between 2017 and 2018. In addition, the 
Katiba exerts violence against representa-
tives of the state (administrators, teachers, 
village chiefs, etc.) as part of its strategy to 
further thin out the feeble and ineffective 
state presence. In the Mopti region, only 30 
to 40 per cent of the territorial administra-
tion personnel is present, and only 1,300 
security forces are stationed across the vast 
region (spanning 79,000 km²).  
Jihadists instrumentalise local inter-
ethnic conflicts to gain sympathizers and 
recruits. The ethnicisation of quite different 
conflicts reinforces the stigmatisation of the 
Peul as “terrorists”. Meanwhile, the state 
does not assume its responsibilities and is 
strongly suspected of bias against the Peul. 
Several observers have alleged that the 
army has tolerated – and even cooperated 
with – the very Dogon militia supposedly 
responsible for the Ogossagou massacre. 
The “Plan de Sécurisation Intégrée des Ré-
gions du Centre” (PSIRC), proclaimed by 
the government in 2017 and supported 
by the European Union, has so far failed to 
produce tangible results. The Joint Force 
of the G5-Sahel States, which has no head-
quarters since the attack on Sévaré in June 
2018, is unlikely to contribute meaningfully 
to stabilisation in the foreseeable future. 
The Limits of Minusma 
In this multi-layered context, the benefits 
and effectiveness of Minusma are uncer-
tain. Last year, a “Strategic Review” of the 
mission commissioned by the UN Secretary-
General was a lost opportunity to shed light 
on the role of the mission. The review was 
neither published nor did it affect the man-
date. 
Public opinion in Mali is very critical of 
the mission. Malians have accused Minusma 
of passivity, in particular denouncing that 
the blue helmets place their own security 
above that of civilians. The government, for 
its part, occasionally succumbs to the temp-
tation to use the mission as a scapegoat for 
its own failures. However, it appears more 
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recently that it has recognised that the mis-
sion brings more advantages than incon-
veniences. If anything Minusma’s presence 
is an important factor in mobilising and 
sustaining international aid. 
Many Western diplomats in Bamako are 
generally supportive of Minusma. They 
stress that the mission and its chief, Maha-
mat Saleh Annadif, play an important role 
as mediators both in Bamako politics and 
with respect to the peace agreement. More-
over, the mission is credited with contrib-
uting to Mali’s stabilisation, though this 
assertion remains diffuse and uncertain. It 
is plausible to maintain, as is often the case, 
that the situation would be much worse 
without Minusma. Yet, this only says that 
Minusma is able to slow rather than stop 
the universally acknowledged deterioration 
of the security situation, much less redress it. 
There is no doubt that Minusma operates 
within a difficult and hostile environment. 
Around half of all blue helmets killed 
worldwide through malign acts since 2013 
have lost their lives in Mali, most of them 
in the north. Moreover, Minusma has to 
expend enormous military and logistical 
efforts to be present in northern Mali. The 
situation imposes security precautions that 
tie up scarce resources which are no longer 
available for carrying out the mandate. 
Around 80 per cent of its military resources 
are devoted to securing its own infrastruc-
ture and the convoys on which the mission 
depends to supply its bases. 
Furthermore, the caveats of the various 
national contingents – including those of 
the German army – and a lack of mobility 
in the form of helicopters and armoured 
carriers make it impossible for the mission 
to expand its scope beyond the vicinity of 
its bases. By and large, Minusma is more a 
target than an anchor of stability. At best, 
it stabilises places where it is physically 
present (Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, etc.). The 
mission is struggling to adapt to its environ-
ment. Its military force is in the process of 
establishing a dedicated sector for central 
Mali, and it has intensified the launch of 
military operations to temporarily control 
some of Mali’s vast zones. More recently, 
the integration of civilian and military 
components has received much needed 
attention. 
Options for the New Mandate 
Adjustments to Minsuma’s mandate must 
be based on the premise that the mission 
will be asked to do more without benefiting 
from increased resources. To begin with, 
the mission should continue to provide sup-
port to the implementation of the peace 
accord. However, this does not necessarily 
require a comprehensive military presence, 
especially in the northern sector (Tessalit, 
Aguelhok, and Kidal), where Minusma has 
deployed more than 2,000 troops that play 
a very limited role as a security provider. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of these 
already scarce military resources are rela-
tively low there, especially since the mis-
sion cannot engage in counter-insurgency. 
From a political, geographical, and demo-
graphic point of view, central Mali is as 
much of a challenge to the stabilisation 
of the country today as the north. Though 
the mission should continue its support of 
the peace process, it would make sense to 
reduce its military footprint in the northern 
sector in favour of increased engagement 
in the Mopti region, where it could bring 
greater added value. 
So far, the UN military force has hardly 
been present in central Mali. Three prior-
ities could be envisaged: first, the protec-
tion of civilians; second, and upon Malian 
request, support for regional and local con-
flict mediation; third, stabilisation based 
on a much more ambitious cooperation 
between the civilian and military pillars of 
the mission, the UN country team, and the 
Malian government. This last point is key: 
If Bamako and the UN do not act together, 
based on a compatible analysis and vision 
with respect to stabilisation efforts in cen-
tral Mali, greater UN involvement in the 
region will be futile. This firstly requires 
that the Malian government express an 
explicit demand for an enhanced presence 
of Minusma in central Mali, including its 
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military force. Until recently, the govern-
ment was opposed to this. 
An enhanced military presence of 
Minusma aims not only at improving the 
security situation. It should also provide 
civilian sections, humanitarian organi-
sations, and the Malian authorities with 
the space to become involved in the Mopti 
region, assisting the state’s return in terms 
of police, justice, administration, and 
teachers. At the same time, Minusma should 
avoid the trap of state substitution. Surely 
the state is part of the problem, but there 
will be no durable solutions in its absence 
either. Joint Minusma operations with the 
Malian army should be envisaged, aimed 
at enhancing the effectiveness of the army 
while concurrently serving as a way to 
monitor the behaviour of Malian troops 
and prevent abuses and exactions. This 
would also enable Minsuma to provide the 
EU Training Mission and other partners 
with key information about the skills and 
needs of the Malian army. A mentoring 
approach would be another possible option 
for these purposes. The UN Security Council 
had mandated Minusma in 2018 to embark 
on this approach with respect to northern 
Mali, though the idea was never imple-
mented. 
The question remains as to what incen-
tives international partners can provide to 
persuade the government to assume respon-
sibility in central Mali. A first step would be 
to condition international support on the 
implementation of concrete measures and 
timetables within the framework of an im-
proved PSIRC. 
It would be an illusion to think that the 
proposed adjustments to the Minusma man-
date will solve all problems. Minusma will 
continue to be a target for jihadist attacks. 
With more personnel and a stronger pres-
ence in central Mali, hostile attacks are 
more likely to increase. Also, a partial relo-
cation of Minusma troops from the north-
ern to the central sector will not enable it to 
establish a presence in all areas of concern; 
increased mobility and a focus on selected 
districts is inevitable and necessary. 
Outlook 
Current developments in central Mali un-
derline what some observers and diplomats 
in Bamako have been arguing for some 
time: It is of little help to look at the multi-
ple layers of conflict in Mali primarily 
through the lenses of terrorism and counter-
terrorism. Nonetheless, terrorism, along 
with migration, remains the primary reason 
for the large-scale international and Euro-
pean involvement in Mali and the wider 
Sahel. Terms like social revolt, insurrection, 
and civil war are arguably more apt to de-
scribe the situation in central Mali. Jihadist 
violence is a challenge, certainly for the 
Malian state, its army, and Minusma. But 
it is not the primary threat to the civilian 
population, neither in central nor northern 
Mali. 
Indeed, to focus squarely on terrorism 
is to overlook the contours of the political 
causes of Mali’s predicament, such as the 
blatant lack of state authority and legitimacy, 
the rule of law, and human security. With 
its fixation on terrorism, the Malian gov-
ernment not only feeds the worst fears of 
Western partners, but also uses this fixation 
to conceal its own mistakes and omissions, 
so far with great success. 
The long shadow of the fight against 
terrorism creates spaces that local and 
national Malian actors ably use to sit out 
the recurrent problems of the country, and 
even use these to their own advantage. 
The Ogossagou massacre should give Mali’s 
international partners an opportunity to 
take a closer look at these interrelationships 
and the incentives that determine the be-
haviour of Mali’s diverse actors. 
Dr Denis M. Tull, Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Divsion at SWP, is currently working as a researcher at the 
Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire (IRSEM) in Paris. 
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